Bater A.
CENTRAL ASIAN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT UNDER BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE *
Аннотация:
water resource security is not only a natural issue but also a politicized and socialized security topic. Upstream and downstream countries form a “water-security complex” around the power asymmetry of water resources, and their interaction modes include conflict, cooperation, or competitive coexistence. Water scarcity in Central Asia is a long-standing key constraint on regional stability and development.
Ключевые слова:
Central Asia, water resources, Chinese influence
The complexity of history, geography, and institutional structures has intensified the water-resource game among Central Asian states. In this context, since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed, it has become an important platform for deepening cooperation between China and Central Asian countries. Whether this initiative has brought about positive changes in the field of water-resource governance is a core issue worthy of in-depth exploration.I. Participation Mechanisms and Practical Dilemmas of Central Asian Countries in “Belt and Road” Water Cooperation. 1. Water-resource governance in Central Asia is an important component of the BRI, the core of which lies in strengthening transboundary water-resource cooperation to promote regional stability and sustainable development. Under the BRI framework, China actively participates in Central Asian water-resource governance by providing financial, technical, and managerial support, and by promoting regional cooperation. Through platforms such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China offers Central Asian countries sustainable support in water-conservancy infrastructure construction, rational allocation of water resources, and management-system development. At the same time, through the BRI Green Development Action Plan, China and Central Asian countries have deepened cooperation in ecological governance, water-saving agriculture, and sustainable use of water resources, driving a green transition.2. The governance of transboundary rivers in Central Asia is particularly critical. Major river systems such as the Amu Darya and Ili cross multiple countries, and upstream and downstream states often dispute water-allocation issues. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as upstream countries, tend to use water resources for hydropower generation, whereas downstream countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan rely more on these sources for agricultural irrigation, especially in the cotton industry. In this process, China, in the role of “experience-sharer,” provides flood-control technologies and management concepts to assist Central Asian countries in enhancing governance capacity, while advocating the establishment of multi-level, multi-stakeholder cooperation mechanisms for transboundary water-resource security, and promoting institutionalized, coordinated regional governance.3. Despite initial achievements, Central Asian water-resource governance still faces multiple challenges. The fundamental contradictions of Central Asian water issues are reflected in three aspects:a. First, Central Asian countries themselves suffer from water scarcity and uneven distribution of water resources. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the main water suppliers, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are the main water users. This natural upstream-downstream contradiction exacerbates the difficulty of cooperation. Disputes over water-use rights in agricultural irrigation and hydropower development have long existed, leading to a lack of consensus and motivation for joint management.b. More concerning is the lack of political trust. Since gaining independence, national identity in Central Asian states has not yet solidified, regional integration remains low, and strategic mutual confidence is lacking. On issues involving national sovereignty and control over resources, states tend to be conservative, favor unilateral action over multilateral collaboration, and view water-resource governance as a matter of national security, thereby excluding external intervention and cooperative mechanisms.c. In addition, institutional development has lagged. Existing regional water-resource management frameworks—such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC)—often lack enforcement power and financial backing, making effective decision implementation difficult. Multilateral platforms have vague mandates and are merely formalistic, unable to effectively integrate China’s inputs under the BRI with regional cooperation needs.4. What specific technical support and financial aid projects has China provided in Central Asian water-resource governance?a. To address the above issues, China has attempted institutional innovation to reshape the regional water-governance landscape. For example, in 2021, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) adopted the “Memorandum on Water-Resources Cooperation,” which, for the first time, included “basin-wide data sharing” on its agenda. Drawing on China’s water-governance philosophy of “prioritizing water conservation, balancing spatial distribution, systemic governance, and coordinated efforts,” the memorandum promotes regional ecological restoration and water-use efficiency optimization. Through package project assistance, technical training, and localized financial instruments, China supports Central Asian countries in carrying out localized water-resource projects.b. In practice, China and Central Asian countries have cooperated on several key projects. For instance, in the Aral Sea ecological restoration domain, China, through the “Central Asia Water-Resources Joint Laboratory,” exported smart irrigation technology to Uzbekistan and, in 2019, provided a US$230 million low-interest loan for embankment reinforcement on the Syr Darya River, promoting basin water-resource regulation and ecological restoration. The Chinese Ministry of Water Resources and the Kyrgyz Hydrometeorological Service jointly constructed five transboundary hydrological monitoring stations, achieving real-time transmission of runoff data for the Issyk Lake basin—a technological empowerment strategy that indirectly eased agricultural water-use disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (data source: Central Asia Water Resources Yearbook, 2023). Through green-development projects, China has driven Central Asian countries to form cooperation consensus based on international norms, reducing the risk of water-resource–induced conflicts.These structural contradictions not only affect regional cooperation in Central Asia but also shape each country’s differentiated attitude toward the BRI. The following section takes Kazakhstan as an example for detailed analysis.II. Kazakhstan’s Water-Resource Governance Actions. As one of the largest countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan occupies a core position in regional water-resource governance, especially regarding interests in transboundary water allocation. Located downstream of multiple transboundary rivers—including the Syr Darya and Ili—Kazakhstan has long faced multiple pressures such as reduced water inflow, insufficient irrigation, and water-quality degradation. It remains highly attentive to water-use issues with upstream countries such as Kyrgyzstan and China.Under the BRI framework, Kazakhstan has adopted a cautious acceptance, active utilization, and partial containment strategy:1. Pragmatic cooperation and technology introduction: Kazakhstan acknowledges China’s experience and technological advantages in water-resource management, actively cooperating with China to introduce technologies in water-saving irrigation, ecological restoration, and water-quality monitoring. Chinese enterprises have participated in the renovation of some irrigation systems, and preliminary work has been carried out with China on building a water-resource information-sharing mechanism.2. Concerns over changes in Ili River water volume: Because the Ili River flows from Xinjiang, China, into Kazakhstan, China’s upstream water-development activities have raised Kazakh concerns about reduced water volume and ecological degradation. Kazakhstan has particularly stressed safeguarding the ecological security of Lake Balkhash, repeatedly requesting more transparent water-use data from China and promoting the establishment of a long-term, institutionalized transboundary water-resource consultation mechanism.3. Strategic use of multilateral platforms: Kazakhstan actively leverages the SCO, the UN Watercourses Convention, and the ICWC to promote the formation of fair, reasonable, and sustainable water-allocation mechanisms, in order to avoid being disadvantaged by bilateral negotiations. It seeks to use international norms to elevate its bargaining power while balancing the influence of external powers such as China and Russia.4. Advancing national water-governance system construction: Domestically, Kazakhstan’s “2050 National Development Strategy” proposes building a green economy and a sustainable water-use system. In 2021, the country adopted the “National Water-Resources Management Plan,” emphasizing reforms such as digital hydrological monitoring, agricultural water-saving, and wastewater treatment and reuse. Kazakhstan enacted the “National Program for Integrated Water-Resources Management and Water Conservation” and the “New Water Code,” providing a legal framework for public participation. These laws clarify the rights and obligations of the public in water-resource management, ensuring that stakeholders can participate through user associations and other institutions.Overall, Kazakhstan under the BRI is not a passive recipient but a key actor seeking strategic balance, strengthening its bargaining capacity, and promoting the modernization of regional governance. Its policy behavior on water-resource governance reflects a continuous trade-off among ecological security, national sovereignty, and regional cooperation.III. How the Belt and Road Initiative Affects Trust and Cooperation Among Central Asian Countries, Especially in Water-Resource Governance. The BRI has had profound impacts on trust and cooperation among Central Asian states, particularly in water-resource governance. These impacts include both positive drivers and accompanying challenges and complexities.On the positive side, the BRI has provided Central Asian countries with infrastructure financing and water-resource technical support, especially in hydrological monitoring and water-resource dispatching capacity building. For example, China-funded hydrological monitoring stations and dam-rehabilitation projects have helped improve local water-management levels. Meanwhile, information-sharing mechanisms and transboundary water-governance pilot projects promoted by China have created new platforms for regional cooperation.However, this cooperation is often bilateral, failing to embed itself within Central Asia’s multilateral frameworks. Information asymmetry between China and other countries, mismatches between technology-driven and rule-driven approaches, and concerns over “debt diplomacy” have led some Central Asian states to remain cautious about deep cooperation. Moreover, China’s emphasis on economic returns in certain collaborations, with relatively less attention to the environmental ethics and regional equity underlying resource governance, makes it difficult to fundamentally alleviate regional distrust.Therefore, the BRI holds potential for enhancing trust and cooperation among Central Asian states in water-resource governance, but it also faces many challenges.The table below illustrates the approximate annual number of cooperation projects between China and the five Central Asian countries in the water-resource governance field under the BRI framework from 2014 to 2024:Chart 1.Number of water resources cooperation projects in the five Central Asian countries under the Belt and Road Initiative from 2014 to 2024.Overall trend: 2014-2017 is the start-up period: there are fewer cooperation projects, mainly focusing on technical exchanges and small-scale pilot projects. 2018-2020 is a steady growth: the "Belt and Road" initiative is deepened, China-Kazakhstan and China-Uzbekistan signed a number of agricultural water conservancy agreements, and promoted the implementation of irrigation system transformation and hydropower station technical transformation projects. 2021-2024 is the acceleration period: the China-Central Asia Summit promoted cooperation in green energy and smart agriculture, and the number of projects increased significantly.IV. Conclusion. Overall, since its implementation, the BRI has indeed brought positive changes to water-resource governance in Central Asia. As an extra-regional power, China has promoted cooperation in water-infrastructure construction and data-sharing mechanisms among Central Asian states through financial, technical, and platform support, thereby easing some inter-state tensions. Moreover, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries, projects led by Chinese enterprises—such as dams, irrigation systems, and hydropower stations—have improved water-use efficiency and energy self-sufficiency. Although challenges such as fragmented governance and geopolitical interference persist, the BRI has, to some extent, shifted regional water-resource governance from zero-sum games toward win-win cooperation. In the future, it will be necessary to further improve multilateral collaboration mechanisms and coordinate policy, legal, and ecological dimensions in order to achieve truly sustainable regional water-resource security.
Номер журнала Вестник науки №5 (86) том 3
Ссылка для цитирования:
Bater A. CENTRAL ASIAN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT UNDER BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE // Вестник науки №5 (86) том 3. С. 1027 - 1036. 2025 г. ISSN 2712-8849 // Электронный ресурс: https://www.вестник-науки.рф/article/23116 (дата обращения: 12.07.2025 г.)
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